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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The sections analyzed are two of the more significant revisions
in the estate area. However, there were also many other changes
adopted by the Legislature such as those dealing with intestate
distribution,73 the settlement of small estates without formal ad-
ministration, 74 simplification of probate practice, 75 and the payment
of legal fees of an attorney-fiduciary prior to the settlement of
account.76  One authority has called these present changes the
most significant legislation in the estate area since the 1930's. 77
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THE "NO-KNOCK" AND "STOP AND FRISK" PROVISIONS
OF THE NEw YORK CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Recently, in response to a message from Governor Rockefeller 1
urging favorable action on proposals submitted by the Combined
Council of Law Enforcement Officials, 2 the New York Legislature
enacted into law two statutes of major import concerning criminal
procedure. These acts, commonly called "No-Knock" 3 and "Stop
and Frisk," 4 have been met with both commendation and criticism
in the press. 5
The purpose of this note is to discuss the factors which
prompted the passage of such legislation, the probable effect of the
provisions upon the field of criminal procedure, and the various
constitutional issues which the acts present.
THE "No-KNOCK" BILL
The "No-Knock" provision amends New York's Code of
Criminal Procedure by permitting a police officer, in executing
73 N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 83.
74 N.Y. SuuR. CT. AcT § 137.
75 N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT §§ 140-42, 146, 153.
76 N.Y. SURR. CT. ACT §231-b. For a comprehensive analysis of these
changes and many others, see SECOND RFP.
77Arenson, 1963 Legislation Affecting Law of Trusts and Estates,
9 N.Y.L.F. 439 (1963).
- 1964 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 1, GOVRNOR'S MESSAGES TO THE LEGISLATURE,
Crime and Criminal Justice 14-15.
2 The Council is composed of the major law enforcement officials of the
State of New York, including, among others, the Attorney General, and the
New York State District Attorneys' Association.
3 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 799 (effective July 1, 1964).
4 N.Y. CODE CRIA. PROC. § 180-a (effective July 1, 1964).
5 See, e.g., Time, March 20, 1964, p. 48; N.Y. Times, March 9, 1964,
p. 8, col. 1.
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a search warrant, to forcibly enter a building without prior
notice of authority and purpose. However, such forcible entry
may be effected only upon the direction of a magistrate who
must first be satisfied by proof under oath that the "property
sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of," or
that the searching officer's life or person would be endangered
by such notice. 6
Prior to this amendment the officer was required to announce
his authority and purpose and demand admission regardless of
the danger or the nature of the property. If admission were
refused, the officer could then use force to gain entrance. However,
because the object of a search is often readily disposable contraband,
such as narcotics or policy slips, any notice prior to entry will
invariably frustrate the purpose of the search.7  In addition to
the loss of evidence, an anouncement of the policeman's presence
jeopardizes his life since the occupant, being forewarned, has
an opportunity to arm himself and resist.s Dissatisfaction with
such serious deficiencies in the law culminated in the enactment
of the "No-Knock" provision under consideration.
An examination of any search statute must necessarily involve
a consideration of the mandates of the fourth amendment. Its
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is expressed
by the maxim that every man's home is his castle." Similar
provisions embodied in the constitutions and statutes of the several
states serve to reinforce and further safeguard against infringement
of this fundamental right of privacy.' 0 These provisions govern
the procedures to be followed in acquiring a warrant as well as
its content and manner of execution. For a better understanding
6 The new provision provides that "the officer may break open an outer
or inner door or window of a building . . . (b) without notice of his
authority and purpose, if the judge . . . issuing the warrant has inserted
a direction therein that the officer executing it shall not be required to give
such notice. The judge . . . may so direct only upon proof under oath, to
his satisfaction, that the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed
or disposed of, or that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another
may result, if such notice were to be given."
7"It is common lmowledge that contraband narcotics worth many
thousands of dollars, and evidence of illegal gambling activities are fre-
quently flushed down toilets and even burned upon the approach of the
police." Memorandum of the New York State Combined Council of Law
Enforcement Officials to the New York State Legislature in Relation to
the Execution of Search Warrants (1964).
8 Ibid.
9 CORNEIzus, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURES 12 (1926). In com-
menting on this maxim, an Assistant District Attorney of Kings County,
has remarked that "a man's home is his castle if he uses it as a prince
should-but should he be permitted to use it as a fortress to the detriment
of his neighbor?" Interview With Mr. E. Golden, Assistant District
Attorney of Kings County, in New York City, March 19, 1964.
10 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12 is typical of the state provisions.
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of the "No-Knock" statute, an examination of the procedural safe-
guards surrounding it is warranted.
Acquiring a Warrant
Procedure
Under both the present and future law in New York, a police
officer, desiring a warrant, is required to file an application with
a judge who presides over a court of competent jurisdiction. The
judge, before issuing a warrant, must examine the affiant under
oath and take his deposition in writing. He must then decide
whether the constitutional requirement of probable cause has been
met. If the facts and circumstances so presented would cause a
reasonable and prudent man to believe that an offense has been,
or is being committed, probable cause has been established,"
When a search warrant is issued without probable cause, the search
is per se unreasonable; 12 it is not made reasonable even though
it uncovers contraband, "fruits" or instrumentalities of crime . 3
Finally, it must be emphasized that it is the judge who must
decide whether sufficient probable cause exists-not the police
officer.' 4 In deciding whether to issue the warrant, the judge
must weigh society's right to combat crime against the fundamental
right of privacy. Thus, our laws have placed an impartial and
detached magistrate between the officer and the search, thereby
providing a built-in deterrent to an unreasonable intrusion upon
the individual's privacy.15
"Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). "In dealing
with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with prob-
abilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical consider-
ations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act." Ibid.
In order to execute a search warrant at night, a police officer must show,
to the judge's satisfaction, why a daytime search would be unsuccessful.
People v. Carminati, 236 N.Y.S.2d 921, 922 (Suffolk County Ct. 1962). See
N.Y. CODE Caum. PROC. § 801.
12 Sobel, A Comment on The Law of Search and Seizure, THE PLEADER
28 (Kings County Criminal Bar Ass'n 1961).
13 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); see Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) ; People v. DeVasto, 198 App. Div. 620, 190 N.Y
Supp. 816 (2d Dep't 1921).
14 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
"Though the police are honest and their aims worthy, history shows they
are not appropriate guardians of the privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects." Ibid.
15 For cases in which the judge held that there was insufficient cause
to issue the warrant see, e.g., Borrego v. State, 62 So. 2d 43, 4547 (Fla.




A further protection afforded the individual by the fourth
amendment is that the warrant must describe the place to be
searched and the articles to be seized with particularity. The
failure to meet these requirements will result in the warrant
being declared invalid.16
Sufficient particularity of location is present if the war-
rant identifies the premises to be searched in a manner that will
enable the officer executing the warrant to locate them with reason-
able effort.17 However, it is not essential that either the owner
or the occupant of the building be named in the warrant.'8 It is
clear, therefore, that because the police officer's function is min-
isterial, the location of the search must not be left to his
discretion, nor may he exceed the directions contained in the
warrant.19 The warrant must also specify and describe the property
to be seized with sufficient certainty to make it "identifiable." 20
In Marron v. United States,2 ' the United States Supreme Court
stated that:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be
seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure
of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be
taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.22
However, the "fruits" of a crime, criminal instrumentalities and
property, the possession of which is itself a crime, may be seized
as incidental to the search even though such items are not
specified in the warrant.23  If the foregoing requirements are not
met or the search is made without a warrant, the officer may be
subjected to civil and criminal liability.2 4 The evidence seized in
such a search is inadmissible.2 5  Furthermore, even if all the
16 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955) ; United States
v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955).
17Fine v. United States, 207 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 923 (1954).
18Dixon v. United States, 211 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1954).
19 In re No. 191 Front Street, 5 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1924).
20 1 VARON, SEARCHES, SEIzURES AND IMUNIrTIES 291 (1961).
21275 U.S. 192 (1927).
22Id. at 196.
23 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); People v. Manzi,
38 Misc. 2d 114, 117, 237 N.Y.S.2d 738, 741 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
24Although both the New York and United States legislatures have
enacted statutes imposing criminal liability in certain circumstances they
have been advanced in only a very few cases. See FED. CODE CRIM. P.
§§2234-35; N.Y. CoDE CLmU. PRoc. §§811-12; N.Y. Prx. LAw §§1786,
1847.
25 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Since a warrant which does
not fulfill the procedural requirements is "unreasonable," evidence obtained
under its order would be inadmissible.
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above procedural requirements are fulfilled, but the methods used
in executing the warrant amount to "conduct that shocks the
conscience," the evidence so obtained will also be excluded.26
Constitutionality of New Amendment
As has been noted, the new provision gives the officer, upon
judicial direction, the right to enter forcibly without notice in
executing a warrant. The decision in Mapp v. Ohio 27 is relevant
to a discussion of this provision since it held that evidence obtained
by a state in violation of the fourth amendment was unconstitution-
ally seized and inadfnissible in the state courts by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment. This exclusionary rule announced in Mapp
applies not only to the physical evidence illegally obtained, but
also to the testimony of officials based upon their observations
made during the course of the illegal search.28 It is clear, therefore,
that if the new statute authorizes an "unreasonable search and
seizure," it must necessarily follow that the statute is uncon-
stitutional, and evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible.
Research has not revealed a single state or federal statute
sanctioning a forcible entry without notice. However, an early
Connecticut decision 29 and numerous cases in California 30 have
judicially engrafted exceptions to the traditional notice requirement
in their states. In addition, the United States Supreme Court
has recently indicated that the notice requirement may be dispensed
with in certain circumstances. 31
Over 140 years ago the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
recognized that exceptional circumstances could justify an entry
into a home without notice. 32 After first announcing the traditional
rule that notice must be given before entry is effected, the court
went on to reason that if the officer had announced his presence,
his life would have been seriously endangered. The court stated
that "it would be a palpable perversion of a sound rule to extend
the benefit of it to a man . . .who waited only for a demand,
26 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The conduct of the
police which was deemed "shocking" was the physical overpowering of the
defendant and the forced application of a stomach pump to extricate narcotics
which he had swallowed.
27-Supra note 25.
28 Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1959). As
has been aptly stated by Judge Cardozo, often "the criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,
150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
29 Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
30 E.g., People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 357 P.2d 289 (1960); People
v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956);
People v. Miller, 162 Cal. App. 96, 328 P.2d 506 (1958).
31 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963).
32 Read v. Case, supra note 29.
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to wreak . . . [upon the officer] the most brutal and unhallowed
vengeance.1
3 3
In California, both the arrest 34 and search 35 statutes require
that notice of authority and purpose, followed by a demand for
admission be made before the police can forcibly enter. Notvith-
standing these provisions its courts have held that forcible entries
made without notice are legal, and the evidence obtained thereby
admissible, when "exigent circumstances" exist.3 Thus, in People
v. Miller,3 7 officers armed with an arrest warrant, forcibly entered
the defendant's home without prior notice, arrested the defendant
and seized evidence of narcotics. The court held that the entrance
was lawful and the evidence so obtained admissible, reasoning
that where technical compliance would probably permit the destruc-
tion of incriminating evidence such compliance is not required.3 s
Similarly, in People v. Havivnond,3 0 officers forcibly entered the
defendant's home without notice and placed him under arrest.
In justifying the entry and upholding defendant's conviction, the
court concluded that "the law does not demand a strict compliance
with the provisions of . . . [the statute] in every case." 40 Com-
pliance was excused because the officers had probable cause to
believe that if "they informed the defendant of their presence and
demanded admission before breaking into the premises, he [de-
fendant] might attempt to dispose of the narcotics . . . or might
attempt to obtain and use his gun." 4 1
3 3 Id. at 170.
34 "[A] peace officer may break open the door or window of the house
in which the person to be arrested is . . . after having demanded admittance
and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired." CAL. PEN. CODE
§844 (West 1956).
35 "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a warrant,
is, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance." CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1531 (West 1956).
3 6 The exigencies recognized in California are (1) an increase in the
officer's peril, and (2) the possibility of frustrating the purpose of his
presence by such notice. People v. Maddox, supra note 30, at 306, 294 P.2d
at 9. It should be noted that six years prior to Mapp California adopted
the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905(1955).
37 Supra note 30.
38 People v. Miller, supra note 30, at 98, 328 P.2d at 507.
39 Supra note 30.4o People v. Hammond, supra note 30, at 854, 357 P.2d at 294.
41 Ibid. In People v. Maddox, the court stated that "suspects have no
constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic con-
stitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting
to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would had
he complied . . . ." Supra note 30, at 306, 294 P.2d at 9. See FED. CODE
CRAM. P. § 2232, making it a federal crime to dispose of goods in order
to prevent their seizure.
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The constitutionality of the California position was tested in
the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. California.4 2  Al-
though prior to this case there had been numerous search and
seizure cases concerning the notice requirement, the argument
that exigent circumstances could excuse literal compliance had
apparently never been advanced in the United States Supreme
Court. In Ker, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence
seized, contending that because the officers had entered his home
without notice, the search was unreasonable and the evidence
obtained thereby inadmissible. The Court noted that the California
courts had, by judicial construction, determined that the notice
requirement of their statute was not absolute when, as here, exigent
circumstances were present. In examining this construction in
light of the fourth amendment, the Court upheld its constitutional-
ity and remarked that the states were not precluded by Mapp from
establishing workable standards of search and seizure "to meet
'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law
enforcement'" as long as those standards complied with the
commands of the fourth amendment.43 The majority concluded
that, considering the exigent circumstances, "the officer's method
of entry, sanctioned by the law of California, was not unreasonable
under the standards of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment." 44
The New York provision permitting forcible entry, without
notice in specified "exigent circumstances," is clearly more pro-
tective of individual rights than the California provision, with its
judicially engrafted exception, examined in Ker. In California,
it is the executing police officer who makes the determination
regarding the existence of exigent circumstances. Under the new
provision in New York it is a detached magistrate who must
be convinced that such circumstances actually exist. Since the
California procedure has successfully withstood constitutional attack,
it is not unreasonable to assume that New York's new amendment,
with substantially greater safeguards against fourth amendment
infringement, will likewise be held constitutional.
THE "STOP AND FRISK" LAW
Section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, commonly
referred to as the "Stop and Frisk Law," authorizes a police
officer to stop a person in a public place, demand that he identify
himself and explain his actions if the officer "reasonably suspects"
that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to
42374 U.S. 23 (1963).
43 Id. at 34.
44 Id. at 40-41. (Emphasis added.)
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commit a felony or serious misdemeanor. 45 If during such ques-
tioning, the officer "reasonably suspects" that his life or limb is
in danger, he may also search that person for dangerous weapons.
Any article uncovered by the officer, the possession of which may
be a crime, is subject to immediate confiscation. After the search
the policeman must either return the article, if lawfully possessed,
or arrest the suspect.
4 6
Circumstances Surrounding Enactment
Prior to the enactment of this statute, which becomes effective
July 1, 1964, there was some doubt whether an officer in New
York could detain a suspect for questioning if he did not have an
arrest warrant and there were no grounds for arrest.47 It was,
however, patently clear that grounds for arrest had to precede a
search made without a warrant unless the search was consented
to.48 The grounds for arrest were limited by statute to four
major situations: (1) where a crime was committed or attempted
in the officer's presence or where he has reasonable grounds for
believing that a crime is being committed in his presence; (2)
where the person arrested had committed a felony, although not
in the officer's presence; (3) where a felony had in fact been
committed, and the officer had reasonable cause for believing the
person to be arrested was the felon; and, (4) where the officer
had reasonable cause to believe a felony had been committed and
that the person to be arrested was the felon, though it should
later appear that no felony had been committed, or, if committed,
that the person arrested had not committed it.49 An arrest made
45 N.Y. CODF, CRIM. PRoc. § 180-a(1).
46N.Y. CoDE Clm. PRoc. §180-a(2). Although the statute is commonly
referred to as the "Stop and Frisk Law" it authorizes a more intensive
investigation than that usually associated with a "frisk." For a case dis-
tinguishing a "frisk" from a "search" see Kalwin Business Men's Ass'n,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 126 Misc. 698, 701, 214 N.Y. Supp. 99, 102 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd on other grounds, 216 App. Div. 6, 214 N.Y. Supp. 507 (2d Dep't
1926).
47 For cases indicating that police cannot detain a suspect where grounds
for arrest do not exist, see Arnold v. State, 255 App. Div. 422, 425, 8
N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (3d Dep't 1933), re'd on other grmnds, 280 N.Y. 326,
20 N.E.2d 774 (1939); People v. Tinston, 6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S.2d 554
(Magis. Ct. 1957). Contra, People v. Entrialgo, 19 App. Div. 2d 509, 245
N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1963). New York defines arrest as "the taking of
a person into custody 'that he may be held to answer for a crime." N.Y.
CODE CR . PRoc. § 167. For a delineation of the grounds for arrest when no
warrant has been issued, see note 49 infra.48 E.g., People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d
462 (1961); People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923).
49 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 177. Prior to 1958, the law required that
a felony had to in fact have been committed, but as a result of an amendment
that year, it is now sufficient if the police officer had "probable cause" to
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on any of the foregoing grounds also gives the officer the right
to search the arrested party.' 0
Although police in New York have always thought that the
grounds for arrest and search were overly restrictive, 5' their
objections were somewhat mollified by the fact that any incrimin-
ating evidence obtained through a search made incident to an
unlawful arrest had been held to be admissible on trial.52  How-
ever, since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Mapp v. Ohio, the New York Court of Appeals has indicated
that such evidence would now be inadmissible.53 As a result, law
enforcement officials argue that they have been seriously hand-
cuffed at the expense of the public's safety.5 4  To enable them
to fulfill their sworn duty, they petitioned the Legislature to enact
laws authorizing them to detain, question, and search suspicious
persons on what they consider more realistic grounds than the
present law allows.5 5 These efforts culminated in the enactment
of the "Stop and Frisk" statute. Under this law, the police may
believe the crime to be a felony, although it is later found that it actually
was a misdemeanor or even no crime at all. N.Y. CODE CRin,. PRoc.
§ 177(4). "Reasonable cause" as used in § 177 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure is a synonym for the term "probable cause" used in the
fourth amendment. Sobel, A Comment o The Law of Search and Seizure,
THE PLEADER 28 (Kings County Criminal Bar Ass'n 1961).
These provisions are essentially a codification of the common law of
arrest. PAPERNO & GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK §§2-3
(1960).
50 People v. Loria, supra note 48.
5 IMemorandum of the New York State Combined Council Of Law
Enforcement Officials to the New York State Legislature In Relation to
Temporary Questioning and Search for Weapons (1964).
52 Prior to Mapp v. Ohio, the Court of Appeals had rejected adoption of
the exclusionary rule on four principal occasions. People v. Richter's
Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943); People v. Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926); People v.
Chiagles, supra note 48; People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903),
aff'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
53People v. Caliente, 12 N.Y.2d 39, 187 N.E.2d 550, 236 N.Y.S.2d
945 (1962) (dictum); see People v. Lombardi, 18 App. Div. 2d 177,
239 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 1963); People v. Rivera, 38 Misc. 2d 586,
23 N.Y.S.2d 620 "(Sup. Ct. 1963). For the judicial procedures involved in
suppressing evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure
see N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC. §§ 813-c, 813-d, 813-e.
54 "For the first twelve months of the exclusionary ruling, narcotics
convictions in New York County-where New York's drug problem is
heaviest-were down 38.5%. . . . During the exclusionary rulings first
year, policy cases in the New York City criminal courts dropped more
than 35%." COMBINED COUNCIL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, LET YOUR
POLICE-POLICE! 4 (1963). See Sobel, A Comment on The Law of Search
and Seizure, THE PLEADER 2-3 (Kings County Criminal Bar Ass'n 1961).
55 Memorandum of the New York State Combined Council Of Law
Enforcement Officials to the New York State Legislature In Relation to
Temporary Questioning and Search for Weapons (1964).
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detain and search a person on the ground that the officer reason-
ably suspects that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be
committed, regardless of whether there is cause for arrest.
Constitutional Questions
By its nature, the "Stop and Frisk" legislation brings into
conflict society's need for order and security and its desire to
maintain individual privacy and liberty. Traditionally the primary
constitutional prerequisite for police infringement of personal free-
dom has been "probable cause" for believing that a crime is
being or has been committed.56 Thus, the following questions
bearing on the validity of the statute are raised. First, is the
activity authorized by the statute, in fact, an arrest? If so, is the
standard employed, namely, "reasonable suspicion," a constitutional
yardstick? Secondly, even if the statute's provisions are held to
be valid because they do not authorize that quantum of personal
restraint necessary to constitute an arrest, does it necessarily
follow that a search can be made incident to the temporary stopping
and questioning which the statute authorizes?
If the statute's provisions constitute an arrest, the standard
employed, "reasonable suspicion," must be equivalent to "probable
cause" or the statute will be held unconstitutional. On the other
hand, even though the authorized detention is construed to be
something less than an arrest, the statutory standard, "reasonable
suspicion," may still be deemed wanting.
American case law clearly indicates that "probable cause" is
something more than common rumor, suspicion, or even a showing
of strong reason to suspect.57  In one of its most recent pro-
nouncements the United States Supreme Court stated that:
the lawfulness of the arrest without warrant . . . must be based upon
probable cause, which exists "where the facts and circumstances within
[the officers'] knowledge . . . [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed." 58
While the standard to be met is a stringent one, "probable cause"
has been found to exist 59 even though the officer acts upon evidence
5 U.S. CoxsT. amend. IV. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949).
57 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y2d 148, 153,
182 N.E.2d 95, 98, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (1962).58 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1963).
59 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73, 175 (1949); People
v. Francis, -31 Misc. 2d 503, 504, 221 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (N.Y. County Ct.
1961).
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insufficient to convict the accused. The test of "probable cause"
has been justified as
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating
these often opposing interests [right of privacy against efficient law
enforcement]. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers'
whim or caprice. 60
Although the need for "probable cause" to arrest as well as its
meaning have been made clear, the Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether the stopping and questioning of suspicious persons
constitutes an arrest. 61 Consequently, it is not at all apparent
which standard the Court would apply assuming it finds that a
stopping and questioning does not require the application of the
standard of "probable cause."
The New York State Legislature, aware that any statute
enacted by it authorizing an arrest on grounds less than "probable
cause" would be found unconstitutional, has carefully labeled the
activity set forth in the statute as a "stopping for temporary
questioning" and the grounds necessary for it as "reasonable sus-
picion." "Reasonable suspicion" was intended to be something
less than "probable cause," although exactly what it connotes re-
mains an open question.62 Since the constitution requires "probable
cause" for an arrest, it must follow that if the activity sanctioned
by the statute is tant.imount to an arrest, then the statute is un-
consitutional. In this-connection, it has been argued that when a
suspect is stopped and required to identify himself and explain
60 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
61 In a recent case, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the
government urged that the Court 'recognize the right to question suspicious
persons. Remington, The Law Relating To "On The Street" Detention,
Questioning And Frisking Of Suspected Persons And Police Arrest Privileges
In General, 51 J. CIRu.1L., C. & P.S. 386, 390 (1960): However, the
Court declined to discuss the question and sent the case back to the trial
court. "[T]he relative dearth of authority in point can be explained by the
fact that few litigants have ever seriously contended that it was illegal
for an officer to stop and question a person unless he had 'probable cause'
for a formal arrest." United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78
,(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
62 See Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J.
Catm. L., C. & P.S., 393, 413 (1963) ; Foote, The Fourth Amendment:
Obstacle Or Necessity In The Law of Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
402, 402-03 (1960). To illustrate the confusion surrounding the use of
phrases such as "reasonable suspicion" and "reasonable ground to suspect,"
see DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960). There the
court interpreted the Uniform Arrest Act's provision of "reasonable ground
to suspect" as equivalent to "probable cause," thereby emasculating the
result intended by the statute.
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his actions, he is actually being placed under arrest.63 This view
is based on the belief that the activity sanctioned by the statute,
rather than the nomenclature applied, determines whether an arrest
has been made. The proponents of this position would determine
whether the statute's provisions result in an actual restraint of
the person. If it does authorize such a restraint, there has been
an arrest.64 Lord Justice Devlin has stated:
The police have no power to detain anyone unless they charge him with a
specified crime and arrest him accordingly. Arrest and imprisonment are in
law the same thing. Any form of physical restraint is an arrest and
imprisonment is only a continuing arrest. If an arrest is unjustified, it is
wrongful in law and is known as false imprisonment. The police have
no power whatever to detain anyone on suspicion or for the purpose of
questioning him. 65
If the United States Supreme Court decides that the "stop"
provision of the statute authorizes an arrest, the statute will un-
questionably be declared unconstitutional as sanctioning an arrest
on less than "probable cause." It then follows that the second
section, permitting searches where "probable cause" is also lacking,
is likewise unconstitutional. On the other hand, even if the
Court finds the "stopping and questioning" section constitutional,
it may still hold the search provision unconstitutional. For it does
not necessarily follow that because a stopping and questioning
on less than "probable cause" is allowed, that a search incident
thereto will also be tolerated. In fact, it is well-accepted that the
fourth amendment will not allow a search on less than probable
cause.
66
Another distinct possibility is that the statute will be held
unconstitutional because of its vagueness. 67 The statute does not
define "temporary questioning" or mention how long this "temporary
questioning" may continue. Neither does it indicate how extensive
an inquiry into the suspect's actions will be permitted. The law
permits a stopping and questioning of one about to commit a
63 United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957). "Any
restraint of liberty is an arrest," People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 872,
194 N.Y. Supp. 326, 332 (Spec. Sess. 1922) (memorandum decision) ; Limbeck
v. Gerry, 15 Misc. 663, 39 N.Y. Supp. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1896). See generally
Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1957);
Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TL~c~s L. REV. 279 (1945).
64 Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle Or Necessity In The Law
Of Arrest?, 51 J. C im. L., C. & P.S. 402, 402-08 (1960).65DEvIiN, The Criminal Prosecution In England 68 (1960) (Emphasis
added.) The New York Legislature may have subconsciously realized the
semantical nature of its distinction since the new statute has been placed
in that section of the Code of Criminal Procedure entitled: "Arrest by an
Officer, without a Warrant." N.Y. CoDE Casim. Paoc. ch. IV.
66 See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
67 Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
1964 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
felony or serious misdemeanor. This term presents the problem
of whether an officer may stop a person whom he believes is
about to commit a crime. The courts may well invalidate this
provision as authorizing police investigation in the absence of any
overt criminal act. The statute would here seem to authorize a
prior restraint upon personal liberty. Perhaps the most important,
and most unclear portion of the statute, is the establishment of
"reasonable suspicion" as the standard to be met rather than the
traditional, judicially-tested standard of "probable cause." It has
been cogently stated that "if probable cause is no longer to be
the test .. .where is the line to be drawn short of indiscriminate
police detention on hunch?"6s
The basic position of the opponents of the statute was suc-
cinctly stated by Mr. Justice Jackson:
It is said that if such arrests and searches [based on less than probable
cause] cannot be made, law enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain.
But, the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our
constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police sur-
veillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people
than the escape'of some criminals from punishment. 69
Others have suggested that there are other less objectionable and
even more effective approaches to efficient law enforcement.
70
Similar Provisions in Other States
Other states have also recognized police entreaties for legis-
lation allowing them to question and search suspects in situations
where less than the traditional ground of "probable cause" exists.
Three states, Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, have
adopted the provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act suggested by
the Interstate Commission on Crime. 71 This act authorizes the
stopping of persons when the officer has "reasonable grounds" to
suspect that a person 72 is committing, has committed or is about
to commit a crime. Such a stopping is not considered to be an
arrest, but merely a "detention" which could continue for as long
as two hours, so as to allow further investigation. During this
68Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle Or Necessity In The Law
Of Arrest?, 51 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 402, 407 (1960).
69 United States v. De Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
70 Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle Or Necessity it Tile Law Of
Arrest?, 51 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 402, 405-06 (1960).
71 Remington, The Law Relating To "On The Street" Detention, Ques-
tioning And Frisking Of Suspected Persons And Police Privileges In General
51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 386 (1960); DEL. CoDE ANN. titl. 11, §§ 1902-03
(1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 594.2-594.3 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
tit. 12, ch. 7, §§ 1-2 (1956).
72 UNiFORM ARREST AcT § 2. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
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period the suspect can also be searched for dangerous weapons
and contraband. If the investigation determines that a crime
has not been committed, the suspect is released and his detention
is not recorded, thereby hopefully eliminating the possibility of
damage to his reputation. 73  As a corollary, if the officer carries
out the detention in accordance with the statute, he becomes immune
from civil and criminal suit. The few cases which have considered
the statute have held the provision permitting a detention con-
stitutional.74  However, the section which authorizes a search for
weapons incident to the detention has not yet been construed in
any of the states which have adopted the Uniform Arrest Act.
A number of other states have also enacted legislation per-
mitting police to stop and question suspicious persons on\ some-
what similar grounds.75  Still other states, notably California, have
authorized such activity by judicial decision rather than by statute.76
Those courts which have permitted stopping and questioning based
on varying degrees of suspicion have, in addition, usually counten-
anced a search of such suspects where police believe it to be
necessary for their safety.77
CONCLUSION
While there is sharp disagreement as to the validity of both
of the statutes discussed, their advocates, as well as their opponents,
agree that effective suppression of crime is an essential goal of
society. The means by which this goal is to be achieved, however,
divides the opposing positions. The controversy primarily revolves
around the weight to be accorded to civil liberties on the one
side, and police efficiency on the other. By elevating the right of
privacy to an absolute, less effective law enforcement is certainly
foreseeable. By extending the latitude of police power too far,
abuses are equally possible. A balance or middle-ground satisfactory
to all must be struck. While the "No-Knock" provision appears
to contain sufficient safeguards against constitutional infringement
so as to be classified as occupying the middle-ground, the "Stop
and Frisk" provision does not, and seems likely to succumb to
constitutional attack. Both statutes, however, will certainly be the
subject of careful scrutiny by the courts in the future.
73 Id. at 322.
74 Cannon v. State, 168 A.2d 108 (Del. 1961); De Salvatore v. State,
supra note 62; Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1961), appeal
dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 (1962).75 HAwAI REv. LAWS tit. 30, ch. 255, §§ 4-5 (1955); MASS. AqN. LAWS
ch. 41, § 98 (1961).
76 E.g., Gisske v. Sander, 9 Cal. App. 13, 93 Pac. 43 (1908); People v.
Hennenman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937); State v. Hatfield, 112 W.
Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932).77 E.g., People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); Gisske v.
Sander, mtpra note 76.
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